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Emerging models for context-aware role-based access con-
trol pose challenging requirements over policy administra-
tion. In this paper we address the issues raised by the de-
centralized administration of a spatially-aware access con-
trol model in a mobile setting. We present in particular
GEO-RBAC Admin, the administration model for the GEO-
RBAC model. The model is grounded on the notion of hier-
archy of spatial domains where a spatial domain is an entity
which collects objects based on organizational and spatial
proximity criteria.
1 Introduction
The administration of RBAC (Role Based Access Control)
policies in large organizations is an important research is-
sue, which is gaining new momentum under the push of new
emerging paradigms like context-aware access control mod-
els [1, 2, 3, 6, 13, 15] and parametrized roles [10, 11, 16].
Typically access control policies are administered in ac-
cordance with an administrative model. An administrative
model defines a language for policy specification. For ex-
ample, the administration model of the RBAC standard de-
fines a set of functions comprising administrative functions
for the creation and maintenance of the element sets and
relations of the RBAC system, and review functions to re-
view the results of the actions created by administrative ac-
tions. Permissions are considered predefined by the under-
lying information system in which RBAC is deployed. In
most cases administration is centralized, that is, the policy
is administered by a unique administrator [9].
Unfortunately RBAC, when applied to large organizations
consisting of thousands of roles and users [20] does not
scale well because it lacks mechanisms for the modular or-
ganization of roles and the decentralized management of
policies. Note that we use the terms administration de-
centralization and administration delegation as synonyms to
mean that someone has the authority of assigning adminis-
trative functions to somebody else and thus of “distributing”
the administration tasks.
To overcome this limit of RBAC, an appealing approach is
to extend the model with the notion of administrative do-
main (simply domain hereinafter). A domain basically de-
notes a portion of the overall policy which is administered
by one or more autonomous administrators. The problem
of how to extend RBAC with domains raises however im-
portant research issues which have been only partially ad-
dressed, such as how to represent domains.
Even more challenging is the introduction of this concept
in a RBAC-based spatially-aware access control model.
Broadly speaking, we say that access control is spatially-
aware if the authorization to access depends on the position
of the user. The growing interest for this class of models is
motivated by the great concern for the security issues in mo-
bile settings. In this paper we focus in particular on the de-
centralized administration of policies relying on the GEO-
RBAC model [8]. Crucial issues include how to account
for the spatial dimension in the administration; how to rig-
orously define domain and administration delegation; and
how to account of the unusual complex structure of roles
comprising attributes and role types.
The models proposed for the administration of RBAC sys-
tems are not able to address such issues. We have thus de-
fined the GEO-RBAC Admin model. The key idea of the
model is the concept of hierarchy of domains. A domain
is a first class entity which is associated with a owner role:
the owner role is the unique role having an authority over
the domain. Domains can be dynamically and recursively
decomposed in smaller domains which are administered by
administration roles based on a rigorously defined mech-
anism of administration delegation. The resulting model
which combines the concept of ownership typical of discre-
tionary access control models with the concepts of domains
and roles, supports a decentralized administration under the
control of the trusted top administrator. Despite of the focus
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on GEO-RBAC, we believe that the proposed approach is of
more general applicability, and can be easily generalized to
be used in different authorization administration models.
This paper is organized as follows: the next section outlines
major requirements and how they have been addressed in
related work; then the key design choices in GEO-RBAC
Admin are illustrated; the model is then formally described
in the subsequent section. Final remarks conclude the paper.
2 Motivations and requirements
We begin by briefly summarizing key concepts of GEO-
RBAC. We then define an ontological view of domains, the
requirements which follow and the related work.
2.1 GEO-RBAC
The model is based on the central concept of spatial role. A
spatial role is a spatially confined organizational function.
A spatial roles becomes effective only when the subject (the
user in the RBAC terminology) who has been assigned that
role is located in the role extent. In that case the role is said
to be enabled. Both the role extent and the user positions are
described as spatial objects (i.e. spatial features compliant
with geo-spatial standards) of the type specified in the role
schema.
The role schema is the template for spatial roles. For
example the role schema for doctor, specified as doc-
tor(HospitalType, LocationType, Lmf) is read as follows:
doctor is the role name, HospitalType is the role extent type;
LocationType is the type of logical position which describes
the position of the user at a certain granularity, for example
building and room; Lmf is the location mapping function
which maps the actual position acquired through some loca-
tion sensing technology to the logical and abstract location.
We refer the reader to [8] for more details.
2.2 Ontological view of domains and re-
quirements
The set of spatial entities which are defined in a GEO-
RBAC policy, such as spatial roles, are assumed to have a
geometric extent which falls inside a possibly bounded ref-
erence space. Such reference space defines the spatial scope
of the organization.
The geographical location represents a natural element of
cohesion inside a community or an organization. Therefore
in large and distributed organizations, consisting of many
units located in different regions, it seems reasonable to
think of the reference space of the access control policy as a
composite space consisting of diverse places and then relate
each of these places to a domain. Accordingly we propose
the following definition of GEO-RBAC domain which ex-
tends the one proposed by Kern & al. [14] to describe a
generic domain: a GEO-RBAC domain is an entity which
collects objects according to some characteristic, such as
the organizational structure, and spatial proximity. We
highlight the property of spatial proximity to point out that
a domain represents some sector of an organization which
can be associated with a location and in which objects and
users are physically close to each other.
From this ontological perspective, it follows the require-
ment that the domain model must have a spatial conno-
tation. Further we envision a scenario in which domains
can be dynamically decomposed in smaller domains (sub-
domains), so to enable a more flexible administration. The
definition of the notion of sub-domain requires addressing
various questions: which kind of relationship exists be-
tween a domain and its sub-domains? Which is the degree
of autonomy of sub-domain administrators? To our knowl-
edge these issues have been not addressed before. We also
recall that the space dimension in GEO-RBAC is used to
strengthen security, therefore the design of the administra-
tive model must be compliant with this general goal. Fi-
nally, it is important to stress that the administrative model
should be finalized to the development of a flexible and
comfortable platform for policy specification and thus it is
important to base the design of the model on principles like
simplicity and clearness [16].
2.3 Related work
The spatial dimension of domains is a novel concept that has
not been investigated before. Related work is thus about the
decentralization of administration in classical models. To
our knowledge, the first to propose the notion of domain
in access control has been Moffet, in his PhD thesis enti-
tled ”Delegation of Authority Using Domain Based Access
Rules” (1990) [17]. This work presents an extension of the
access control matrix in which a domain denotes a collec-
tion of objects which are explicitly grouped together for a
purpose. Moreover domains have administrators which can
delegate to other users the administration of other domains.
This idea, that resembles our approach, did not have, how-
ever, a strong follow-up at level of research.
The concern for the decentralized administration in RBAC
systems presents many variations. In this section we
overview significant approaches focusing, in particular, on
the following two questions:
• How can a domain be represented in RBAC systems?
• Who can delegate the administration of what to whom?
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How can a domain be represented?
In ARBAC97 [19] a domain is indirectly represented
through the notion of role range, namely a pair of roles con-
fining the portion of role hierarchy, namely the set of roles,
that an administrator can administer. Role hierarchy char-
acterizes also the administrative model proposed by Cramp-
ton [7]. Oh and Sandhu in [18] propose an administration
model named ARBAC02. ARBAC02 retains the main fea-
tures of ARBAC97, and adds the concept of organization
unit, which represents a group of individual involved in re-
lated tasks that are modeled through the concepts of user
pool and permission pool which seem of little generality.
A different approach is proposed in UARBAC [16]. UAR-
BAC is a family of administrative models for RBAC which
consists of a basic model and one extension UARBACP .
In particular UARBACP adds constraint-based adminis-
trative domains: the basic idea is to assign one or more
attributes to each object in the RBAC system and then de-
fine administrative domains using constraints on these at-
tributes. The notion of domain is however not explicit, in
that it can be represented by the value of some arbitrary
attribute of objects or even by a combination of values of
attributes. Further this approach makes strong assumptions
on the nature of the RBAC model, in that domains can only
be added if objects are parametrized.
The administration of RBAC-based context-aware access
control has been addressed by X-GTRBAC Admin [5]. A
salient feature of this model is that domains are first class
objects, namely have an identifier and can be related to other
objects, in much the same way an Internet domain is defined
by a name. A policy is then explicitly associated with a do-
main. Despite its simplicity, this notion of domain is fairly
powerful, since it is actually independent from the concepts
of the underlying RBAC and thus can be naturally added to
a variety of models.
Who can delegate the administration of what to whom?
A major mechanism for administration delegation is pro-
vided by discretionary access control (DAC) models [4, 12],
in that a subject with a certain access permission is capable
of passing that permission on to another subject. Typically
the delegation is performed separately for each permission
and subject. Further, there is no a-priori distinction between
the subjects that can administer a permission and those who
cannot. Moreover, it lacks the notion of domain as aggrega-
tion of subjects and permissions.
In the decentralized administration models based on RBAC,
domains are administered by members of roles. The roles
which are enabled to exercise administration functions may
be either administration roles like in ARBAC97 and X-
GTRBAC or application-dependent roles like in UARBAC.
Separating administrative roles from non-administrative
roles ensures a stronger security control and thus is prefer-
able in contexts in which strong security is requested. In
ARBAC97 and X-GTRBAC the Security System Officer is
the only subject allowed to create administrative roles and
thus decentralize administration. The delegation hierarchy
thus consists of only two levels, the Security System Offi-
cer and the application-dependent administrative roles. In
large organizations, however, a delegation hierarchy orga-
nized on two levels may be not sufficiently flexible because
of the complexity of the organizational structure.
3 Baseline of the approach
Current approaches provide only partial solutions to the re-
quirements posed by the the GEO-RBAC administration.
We have thus investigated a model which tries to rigor-
ously introduce the spatial dimension in the notion of do-
main. GEO-RBAC Admin is based on a number of key
concepts: domain and domain hierarchy, delegation permis-
sion, domain scoping rules, soundness and administration
completeness of domains.
3.1 The representation of domains
Following the approach proposed in X-GTRBAC Admin,
we consider domains as first class objects because such
an approach ensures a clean design. However, unlike X-
GTRBAC, a domain, besides a name, has attributes. One
attribute is mandatory, namely the reference space of the
domain. The reference space of domain d is the (possibly
bounded) space, which confines the spatial entities and the
position of users defined in d. The reference space is rep-
resented by a spatial feature of system-defined type. Top-
Domain is the system-defined domain; conventionally its
reference space is the feature covering the whole Earth.
3.2 Administration of domains
A domain can be assigned one or more admin roles (admin-
istration roles) and regular roles where regular stands for
non-administrative. Admin roles are assigned admin users
while regular roles are assigned regular users. The set of
admin roles (admin users) is disjoint from the set of regular
roles (regular users).
An admin role is uniformly represented as a GEO-RBAC
role 1: in particular the admin role is a role defined over the
extent representing the reference space of the domain.
1Specifically an admin role is a GEO-RBAC non-spatial role, because
the role extent and the logical position coincide with the reference space
and that matches with the definition of non-spatial role
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Admin roles are instances of admin schemas. We empha-
size that admin schemas are used in domains for a specific
purpose, specifically to define templates for the admin roles
in sub-domains. Such templates define a common name
and a set of permissions which, for how the GEO-RBAC
model is defined, are automatically assigned to all instances
of the schema. For example one can define the role schema
AdminUser, assign it a set of permissions and then create
admin roles in sub-domains as instances of that schema, say
AdminUser(subd1), AdminUser(subd2), where subd1
and subd2 are reference spaces of sub-domains. This con-
cept of admin schema ultimately enables the modular or-
ganization of administrative roles and permissions in sub-
domains.
Conventionally TopAdmin is the unique admin role in the
Top Domain and it has the whole set of permissions.
3.3 Who creates domains? The adminis-
tration delegation issue
A first issue is to define who administers the sub-domain.
The key choice is that the only role who has such author-
ity is the admin role of the user who has created the sub-
domain. Such a role is named owner role. Each sub-
domain, except for Top Domain, has thus a owner role: it
is the unique role that has an authority over the sub-domain
and thus can create and confer power (and revoke) to ad-
ministrators of sub-domains. Therefore it cannot occur that
admin roles in a sub-domain are created by different roles;
either it cannot occur that the admin role of a sub-domain is
assigned permissions by different roles.
The next issue is how to authorize delegation. We say that
an admin role is authorized to delegate administration if it
has been assigned the delegation permission: the delega-
tion permission allows one to create and administer sub-
domains. It is important to notice that a member of the
creator role can only delegate a subset of role permissions;
therefore it cannot occur that one assigns a permission that
he or she does not hold. The delegation permission, if as-
signed to the admin role r of a sub-domain, authorizes r to
further delegate administration. Notice that this mechanism
is similar to the mechanism of grant option in discretionary
models, in that the subject who has the delegation permis-
sion is authorized to further propagate the administration
delegation.
3.4 Objects and domain scoping rules
A domain is associated with a set of objects. Objects con-
sist of application objects and system objects. The former
are the information resources of the application;the latter
are the objects which are created and maintained by domain
administrators.
An issue that is generally ignored in literature concerns the
rules which govern the visibility and thus accessibility of
objects across domains. The problem is exemplified as fol-
low: can an object created in a domain d, say a role named
doctor, be accessed from domain d′? Since this problem
resembles the definition of scoping rules in programming
languages, we refer to these criteria of visibility as domain
scoping rules. Note that we only consider the issue of visi-
bility for system objects. We have identified three possible
approaches. A first approach is to have a pool of objects,
visible from all the application domains, thus global, and
administered by the members of Top Admin. The draw-
back of this approach is the limited autonomy of the do-
main administrator in the management of the domain pol-
icy. A second approach is to assume that regular objects
are local to each domain. This approach ensures the maxi-
mum autonomy; the drawback is that the objects which are
of common concern for the organization and that could be
shared or reused must be replicated in each domain. The
third approach is a compromise of the previous two and is
the one adopted in GEO-RBAC Admin: a subset of the sys-
tem objects are global while the remaining system objects
are local. The practical effect of this domain scoping rule
is the following: when the user connects to the system and
specifies the domain in which he or she is registered, the ob-
jects which become available are those local to the domain
and those which are globally defined.
In principle, the distinction of what is global or local could
exclusively depend on the application needs and the demand
of re-usability of system objects across domains. In prac-
tice, the choice can be also driven by usability concerns.
This consideration results from the experiments we have
carried out with the prototype of the administration system.
This prototype enables the creation of various elements of
the domain policy which are then stored in a spatial DBMS.
It turns out that some objects may be complex to specify for
a “normal” administrator: for example the specification of
a location mapping function, which ideally can be whatever
function returning a logical position out of the real position,
entail programming capabilities that administrators do not
necessarily have. It seems thus more convenient to let the
Top Admin administer these objects, under the assumption
that the member of such a role has the needed competences.
In conclusion, domain scoping should result from the de-
sired trade-off between simplicity of use and administrative
autonomy. In its present version, the domain scoping rules
are cabled in the model. A more flexible management of do-
main scoping rule however would be desirable. This aspect
will be investigated as part of future plans.
In the next section we provide a formal definition of the
GEO-RBAC Admin model.
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4 Specification of GEO-RBAC Admin
4.1 Objects
System object class Meaning
CR Regular roles class
CRS Regular role schemas class
CAR Administrative roles class
CARS Administrative role schemas class
CEXT Role extent types and instances
CLPS Logical position types and instances
CLMF Logical mapping functions
CU Regular users class
CAU Administrative users class
Table 1. System classes
Objects are grouped in a set of predefined classes. Classes
which comprise system objects are system classes, other-
wise application classes. System classes in turn consist
of regular and administrative classes. System classes, re-
ported in Table 1, are application independent. It can be no-
ticed that system classes include not only the class of role
schemas but also the various classes of schema components.
The choice of the granularity of objects, in particular com-
posite objects, that is objects consisting of parts like role
schemas is an important design issue. The set of application
classes is application dependent. Without significant loss of
generality we assume a unique class denoted as CAP .
4.2 Permissions
Access modes A key design choice concerns the defini-
tion of the access modes. At one extreme, one could define
an access mode for each administrative operation. Unfortu-
nately the resulting set could be redundant. The choice is
thus to define access modes only for the operations which
modify the state following the principle of reversibility[16].
Such a principle states that a permission should enable the
reversibility of an action, for example the permission for
creating on object should also authorize the deletion of the
object. The set AM of access models over administrative
objects is thus defined as follows:
AM = {admin, assignPrm, assignUser, delegate}
where: admin allows one to create and delete an object; as-
signPrm is to assign and revoke permissions on roles and
role schemas; assignUser is to assign and revoke users to
roles; delegate is to authorize and revoke administration
delegation.
The set of access mode over application objects is applica-
tion dependent.
Permissions. Permissions comprise application permis-
sions denoted as PRMSA and system permissions denoted
as PRMSS .
Permission Meaning
[CR, admin] - to create and delete a regular role
[CRS , admin] - to create and delete a regular role schema
[CR, assignPrm] - to assign and revoke regular permissions to
regular roles
[CRS , assignPrm] - to assign and revoke regular permissions to
regular role schemas
[CR, assignUser] - to assign and revoke regular users to regular
roles
[CEXT , admin] - to create and delete role extent types and
instances
[CLPS , admin] - to create and delete logical position types
and instances
[CLMF , admin] - to create and delete logical mapping func-
tions
[CU , admin] - to create and delete regular users
[CAR, delegate] - to create and delete a domain, an admin
schema, an admin role for the created do-
main;
to assign and revoke a user to the admin role,
a permissions to an admin role
Table 2. The set PRMSS of system permis-
sions
System permissions take the form: [c, a] where c is a sys-
tem class and a an access mode. For example [CR, admin]
is the permission of creating and deleting regular roles. Sys-
tem permissions are listed in Table 2. In general, each ac-
cess mode authorizes two or more operations.
In particular the delegate access mode authorizes the whole
set of operations which are needed to delegate (or revoke)
administration to the admin roles of a sub-domain. Since
authorizing each of these operations separately would be
useless because they are all part of a unique workflow, a
unique permission is introduced for the whole set of opera-
tions, the delegation permission [CAR, delegate].
Unlike system permissions, application permissions are
application-dependent. Such permissions can be defined
over a class of application objects or over a single appli-
cation object. In the latter case, permissions are local to the
domain.
4.3 Domains
A domain d is represented by the tuple:
d ≡< id, n, s >
where id the domain identifier, n is the domain name, and
s is spatial feature of system defined type representing the
reference space. Note that the domain identifier is needed
since the same name can be used for domains created by
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different administrators. Since domains have a hierarchical
structure, the unique identifier can take the form of absolute
path along the hierarchy of domains.
We denote with TopDomain the system-defined domain:
TopDomain ≡< id0, T opDomain, TopF >, where
TopF is the system-defined feature which covers the whole
Earth. D denotes the set of domains.
Example 1 Suppose that Italy and Switzerland are the iden-
tifiers of two spatial features of system-defined type. Further,
suppose that we would like to define two domains, one for
each country, say MobileI and MobileCH. The two domains take
the form: < id1, MobileI, Italy > and < id2, MobileCH,
Switzerland >
4.3.1 State of a domain
Each domain has a state. The state defines the sets and rela-
tions which hold in the domain at a certain stage. A domain
is described at intensional level by a domain schema and at
extensional level by domain states (simply state). We intro-
duce the following notation: C to denote the set of system
classes; CAP to denote the unique application class; O to
denote the set of all possible objects. Moreover, function
OBJS(c) returns the set of possible objects in O of class c.
Definition 1 (Schema of domain state) The state schema of
a domain is defined by the following tuple of functions:
- OBA : D → 2O such that OBA(d) ⊆ OBJS(CAP ). The
function returns the set of application objects in a domain
- OBS : C × D → 2O such that OBS(c, d) ⊆ OBJS(c).
The function returns the set of system objects of a certain
class in a domain.
- PA : D → 2PRMSA returns the set of application permis-
sions in a domain.
- PS : D → 2PRMSS returns the set of system permissions in
d in a domain.
- SUA : D → 2OBJS(CU )×OBJS(CR) such that SUA(d) ⊆
OBS(CU , d) × OBS(CR, d). The function returns the set
of pairs: regular user-regular role in a domain.
- ASUA : D → 2OBJS(CU )×OBJS(CAR) such that
ASUA(d) ⊆ OBS(CAU , d) × OBS(CAR, d). The func-
tion returns the set of pairs: admin user-admin role in a do-
main.
- SPAI : D → 2OBJS(CR)×PRMSA such that
SPAI(d) ⊆ OBS(CR, d) × PA(d). The function returns
the set of pairs: regular role-permission in a domain.
- SPAS : D → 2OBJS(CRS)×PRMSA such that
SPAS(d) ⊆ OBS(CRS , d) × PA(d). The function re-
turns the set of pairs: regular role schema-permission in a
domain.
- ASPAI : D → 2OBJS(CRS)×(PRMSS
⋃
PRMSA) such
that ASPAI(d) ⊆ OBS(CAR, d) × (PS(d)
⋃
PA(d)).
The function returns the set of pairs: admin role-permission
in a domain.
- ASPAS : D → 2OBJS(CARS)×(PRMSS
⋃
PRMSA)such
that ASPAS(d) ⊆ OBS(CARS , d) × (PS(d)
⋃
PA(d)).
The function returns the set of pairs: admin role schema-
permission in a domain.
A domain state instance (simply domain state or state), de-
noted as I(d) is the state schema applied to domain d. Con-
ventionally the admin roles in a domain d have as extent
the reference space of d. We denote with I the state of the
domain set, defined a I = {I(d), d ∈ D}
The TopDomain is such that each state I(TopDomain) has
the properties described below.
Definition 2 (State of the TopDomain) The state of the Top-
Domain satisfies the following properties:
- PA(TopDomain) = PRMSA
- PS(TopDomain) = PRMSS
- OBS(CAR, T opDomain) = {TopAdmin}
- OBS(CAU , T opDomain) ⊇ {TopUser}
- OBS(Co, T opDomain) = ∅ with o ∈ {CR, CU , CRS}




- ASUA(TopDomain) ⊇ {[TopDomain, TopUser]}
4.3.2 Admin hierarchy
An admin role ar of a domain d can create sub-domains and
delegate administration to admin roles in the newly created
sub-domains. Given a domain d2 created by an admin role
ar of a domain d1 we call d1 the parent domain of d2 (d2
is sub-domain of d1) and role ar the owner of d2. By def-
inition the owner of a domain is unique. We recall the key
design choice, that the owner of a domain is the only admin
role that can administer that domain and the corresponding
admin roles and admin users.
The domain ownership relationship is represented by the
Admin Hierarchy. The Admin Hierarchy consists of a par-
tially ordered set of nodes where nodes take the form [d, ar]
with d a domain and ar an admin role in d or⊥ (undefined).
Definition 3 (Admin hierarchy) Let I be the state of the do-
main set. The Admin Hierarchy AH = (T,≺) in I is such that:
(1) T ⊆ {[d, ar] | d ∈ D, ar ∈ OBS(CAR, d)
⋃
{⊥})
(2) ≺ ⊆ T × T is a partial order. The ordering [dm, rm] ≺
[dn, rn] holds iff dm 6= dn, rm 6= ⊥ and one of the following
two conditions is true:
– rm is the owner of dn
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– ∃[d, r] ∈ T such that [dm, rm] ≺ [d, r] ≺ [dn, rn]
(3) ∀ [d, ar] ∈ T, [TopDomain, TopAdmin] ≺ [d, ar]
It can be easily shown that the admin hierarchy constitutes
a tree. In fact each node represents an admin role for a do-
main. Since by definition, an admin role in a domain can be
only created by an admin role in another domain, it follows
that every node, different from the root, has a unique parent
node. Therefore since the set of ancestors of a node is to-
tally ordered and has a bottom element, the partial order is
a tree.
Example 2 Assume that TopAdmin has created two do-
mains. The rectangles in Figure 1 correspond to domains:
dom1, and dom2 with reference space s1 and s2 respec-
tively. Moreover the Top Admin has created two admin
roles, one for each of the newly created domains, named re-
spectively ar(s1), ar(s2). Notice that these two admin roles
are instances of the same schema ar. The member of the
former role has created two sub-domains, dom11, dom12
over space s11 and s12 respectively. The former is adminis-
tered by two admin roles: ar1(s11), ar2(s11); the latter by
a unique role ar1(s12). The is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Admin hierarchy
Finally, we introduce the notion of global state, defined by
the pair I∗ =< I , AH >.
4.3.3 Constraints on states
Administrative operations determine a change of state. Op-
erations can lead, however, to an improper state. For ex-
ample, if a role schema is removed from a domain while
instances of that schema still exist, then the enforcement of
those roles would be impossible or fail in any case. In that
case we say that the state of the domain is unsound. It may
also occur that some necessary administration operation has
not been performed yet and thus a domain is in a transitory
state. In that case, we say that the state of the domain is ad-
ministratively incomplete. For example, if in a domain there
is a unique admin role which is authorized to administrate
regular roles and that admin role is removed, then the regu-
lar roles which still exist cannot be administered any longer
until a new administrator is appointed.
The understanding of the conditions which must hold for
domains to be sound and administratively complete is a nec-
essary step for the definition of administration operations.
For that purpose, we explicitly represent these conditions in
terms of constraints. In what follows we introduce diverse
sets of constraints.
4.3.4 Soundness of domains and admin hierarchy
Let I be the state of the domain set.
Definition 4 (Soundness of domain) A domain d ∈ D is
sound in I iff it holds:
a) Regular and admin roles in d have an extent contained in the
reference space of d.
b) Each regular role is instance of a regular role schema in d,
that is, ∀r ∈ OBS(CR, d), ∃rs ∈ OBS(CRS , d), rs =
Sk(r).
The first condition implies that roles cannot be played out-
side the domain boundaries since domains constrain the
spatial extent in which the movement of users and their op-
erations is significant for the domain policy. The second
condition is to prevent role instances from being orphans of
their schema. We now define when the Admin Hierarchy is
sound. Preliminarily we introduce the following functions:
d Prms(r, d) returns the set of permissions assigned to ad-
min role r in domain d comprehensive of the permissions
assigned to the role schema or directly to r; Owner(d) re-
turns the admin role which is owner of d; Parent(d) returns
the domain of the owner role.
Definition 5 (Soundness of Admin Hierarchy) Admin Hi-
erarchy AH = (T,≺) is sound in I iff for each domain d ∈
D − {TopDomain} it holds:
c) It exists at least one node [d, r] ∈ T for some value of r.
d) The owner role of d has the permission [CAR, delegate],
that is: (Owner(d), [CAR, delegate]) ∈
ASUA(Parent(d)).
e) The reference space of d is spatially contained in the refer-
ence space of the parent domain.
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f) Permissions assigned to an admin role ar in d are in-
cluded in the set of permissions assigned to the owner
of d, that is: ∀p ∈ d Perm(ar, d) → p ∈
d Perm(Owner(d), Parent(d)).
Condition c) means that there are no domains which are iso-
lated. Condition d) means that there is at least one admin
role in the parent domain which is authorized to delegate
administration. Condition e) implies that a domain is spa-
tially confined by the space of the parent domain. The last
condition is to prevent one from delegating permissions that
he or she does not have. Note that the delegated permissions
can be only defined on classes of objects and not on single
objects, since these are local to each domain. It is easy to
show that a sound Admin Hierarchy has the following prop-
erties:
Proposition 1 (Properties of admin hierarchy) Let
AH = (T,≺) be a sound admin hierarchy in I.
• Given two domains d1 and d2, it holds:
- If d1 and d2 are not comparable, in that one domain is
not the ancestor of the other then the respective refer-
ence spaces, d1.s and d2.s can be spatially disjoint or
overlap.
- The set of admin roles in d1 and d2 as well as the cor-
responding sets of admin users are disjoint, that is:
OBS(CAR, d1)
⋂
OBS(CAR, d2) = ∅
• The value of the admin role in node [d, ar] ∈ T may be
undefined only if the node is a leaf in AH .
4.3.5 Administration completeness
Some objects are global, because of domain scoping rules
and thus are administered by the top administrator. Domain
scoping rules are expressed as constraints as follows:
Definition 6 (Domain scoping rules) Forall d ∈ D −
{TopDomain} it holds:
• OBS(CEXT , d) = OBS(CEXT , T opDomain)
• OBS(CLPS , d) = OBS(CLPS , T opDomain)
• OBS(CLMF , d) = OBS(CLMF , T opDomain)
The state of a domain which is sound is also administra-
tively complete if such domain has at least one member of
an admin role and every object which is local to the domain
is administered. The following conditions formally define
the administration completeness property.
Definition 7 (Administration completeness) Let d ∈ D a
domain which is sound in I. Then d is also administratively com-
plete iff it holds:
• Each admin role has been assigned at least one admin user.
• The owner role of a domain has at least one admin user.
• For each regular role and regular user o, there must be
at least one admin role ar ∈ OBS(CAR, d) which is
authorized to administer o, that is (ar, [Co, admin]) ∈
ASPAI(d).
• For each applicative object o ∈ OBA(CAP , d), there must
be an admin role that administers o.
Finally, consider a global state. It can be easily shown that
the following property holds:
Proposition 2 Let I∗=< I, AH > be a global state. If
each domain d ∈ D is administratively complete, and AH
is sound, then for every object o, it exists an admin user who
is authorized to administer o.
4.4 Administrative operations
Table 3 reports the administrative operations. In this sec-
tion, for the sake of space, we only describe the process
of delegating administration to a sub-domain using the op-
erations of CreateDomain, CreateAdmObj, GrantAdmPrm,
GrantAdmUser.
Administration delegation: workflow Assume that the
member of an admin role ar in current domain cd wants to
create a sub-domain sd. 1) As first step ar creates a sub-
domain through the operation CreateDomain. A child of
node [ar, cd] which is only partially filled is created and
added to the admin hierarchy. 2) If not already existing, ar
creates an admin schema ars′ in the current domain through
the operation CreateObj and possibly assigns permissions
to that schema through the operation GrantAdmPrm. 3)
ar creates an admin role ar′ as instance of schema ars′
through the operation CreateAdmObj and possibly assigns
permissions through GrantAdmPrm: ar′ is thus automati-
cally added to the set of admin roles of sub-domain sd. The
admin hierarchy is updated.4) Finally ar creates an admin
user au′ through CreateAdmObj and assigns it to the admin
role ar′ through GrantAdmUser.
Notice that if the delegation permission is then assigned
to the admin role of the newly created sub-domain, then
the administration can be further delegated to nested sub-
domains. Further, observe that the creator of a sub-domain
can also add new admin roles after the domain is created.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model for the decentral-
ized administration of GEO-RBAC based on hierarchy of
spatial domains. The approach is quite flexible. Moreover,
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Admin object class meaning
CreateRegObj(c, o) Create a regular object o of class c ∈ {CR, CRS , CU}
DeleteRegObj(c, o, d) Delete a regular object o of class c ∈ {CR, CRS , CU}
CreateAdmObj(c, o, d) Create an admin object o of class c ∈ {CAR, CARS , CAU} in domain d
DeleteAdmObj(c, o, d) Delete a admin object o of class c ∈ {CAR, CARS , CAU} in domain d
CreateDomain(d, s) Create a domain d with reference space s as sub-domain
DeleteDomain(d) Delete domain d
CreateSchemaElement(c, e) Create a role schema element e of class c ∈ {CEXT , CLPS , CLMGF }:
DeleteSchemaElement(c, e) Delete a schema element e of class c ∈ {CEXT , CLPS , CLMGF }
GrantRegPrm(c, r, p) Assign application permission p to regular object r of class c ∈ {CR, CRS}
RevokeRegPrm(c, r, p) Revoke application permission p to regular object r of class c ∈ {CR, CRS}
GrantAdmPrm(c, r, p, d) Assign permission p to admin object r of class c ∈ {CAR, CARS} in domain d
RevokeAdmPrm(c, r, p, d) Revoke permission p to admin object r of class c ∈ {CAR, CARS} in domain d
GrantRegUser(u, r) Assign regular user u to regular role r
RevokeRegUser(u, r) Revoke regular user u to regular role r
GrantAdmUser(u, r, d) Grant admin user u to admin role r in domain d
RevokeAdmUser(u, r, d) Revoke admin user u from admin role r in domain d
Display(d, {c1, ..cn}) Display on map the confine of domain d along with the spatial features of type c1, .., cn
Table 3. Administration operations
although nested domains can be freely created, the adminis-
tration still remains indirectly under the control of the Chief
Security Officer and that is important in contexts demand-
ing strong access control. Some important issues are still
open and will be investigated as part of the future activity:
• User sharing. In GEO-RBAC Admin, a users u who
is registered in domain d is not visible in a sub-domain
d′. The question is thus how to enable a more flexible
management of users, so to allow a sort of automatic
registration in sub-domains. To that purpose, a possi-
ble approach is to share users between domains.
• Administrative object sharing. An extension of
the previous functionality is to enable the sharing
of additional administrative objects, in particular role
schemas. That would allow the specification of a role
ontology for the organization.
• Mobility. The issue is how to support mobility of users
across domains, enabling a transparent connection to
heterogeneous domains.
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